AESTHETIC OBJECTIVISM’S “JOYOUS
POSSESSION OF THE (NATURAL) WORLD,”
TOWARDS A RELIGIOUSLY USEFUL
APPRECIATION OF SUBLIMITY IN
THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

Maia Wellborn
Kant tells us that two things awe him most: the starry
skies above and the moral law within. But, we might ask, is
Kant mistaken in grounding the experience of sublimity in his
moral philosophy as an “attempt to unify art and ethics?”1
Appreciating the natural sublime in a way that seeks to understand the experience in an all-encompassing manner seems
quite sensible in some approaches to environmental aesthetics.
Understandably, then, scholars such as Allen Carlson and Noël
Carroll seem to defend versions of aesthetic objectivism such
that these connections are maintained. However, experiences in
the natural world that are termed “sublime,” can be better
understood through a specific kind of religious-aesthetic
appreciation. In what follows, I argue that the natural sublime
(sublimity as experienced in the natural world) is an experience
that is closer to what Merold Westphal might call “religiously
useful,” in that it inspires the sort of awe and celebration that
connects us to the divine. Building on a view of the sublime
which mirrors Emmanuel Levinas’s view of the ethical encounter with the Other, I contend that the natural sublime frustrates
1
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an aesthetic objectivist approach that requires truth values for
our judgments of what is beautiful and sublime. I will suggest
that since such objectivist accounts do not accurately capture
the phenomenological subjectivity experienced in the natural
sublime, postmodern religious thought can helpfully supplement the field of environmental aesthetics.
I will proceed as follows. First, I will describe what I
take to be the aesthetic objectivist theories of Carlson and
Carroll, showing why they are inadequate in describing our
experience of the natural sublime. Next, I will show how a
comparison of Levinas’s ethical encounter and the natural
sublime is relevant to the discussion in environmental aesthetics
because it grounds the content of this experience. Moreover, it
does so in a way that is “religiously useful” in ways similar to
Westphal’s description of the God of postmodern religious
thought. I conclude that an aesthetic appreciation of the natural
sublime should not reduce the subjective experience to the
phenomenal object’s properties and our judgments of it to true
or false propositions. That problematic approach falsely
delineates the sublime as merely an object in nature, thus
erasing the existential essence of such experiences.
The debate regarding how we ought to appreciate
nature is a much-discussed issue in contemporary environmental aesthetics. Allen Carlson notices the issues that arise in our
attempts either to treat nature as art objects or reduce nature to
picturesque landscapes. When we treat nature as an art object
we take it out of its environmental context and when we reduce
nature to picturesque landscapes we selectively and inappropriately choose from the whole of nature limited portions of it. As
Ronald Rees points out, this latter view of reducing nature to
the picturesque has “confirmed our anthropocentrism by
suggesting that nature exists to please as well as to serve us. …
It is an unfortunate lapse which allows us to abuse our local
environments and venerate the Alps and the Rockies.”2 Finding
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both approaches problematic, Carlson attempts to understand
nature in terms of its appropriate context, similar to how we
make aesthetic judgments of works of art. He writes, writes:
If to appropriately aesthetically appreciate art we must
have knowledge of art forms, classifications of works,
and artistic traditions, then to appropriately aesthetically appreciate nature we must have knowledge of the
different systems and elements within those environments…Thus, the natural and environmental sciences
are central to appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature.3
In the same way in which knowledge of painting in the early
twentieth century is necessary for appreciating the works of the
Cubists, some knowledge of flora and fauna are necessary to
appreciate a natural environment rich in flowers and plants.
Noël Carroll does not reject Carlson’s account, but offers an alternative view in which he claims that some aesthetic
judgments are emotional responses to nature, and that these are
just as valid as judgments based upon an understanding of the
natural sciences. What validates them is the appropriateness of
the emotional response to the natural environment a person
experiences. Carroll understands that a central question
concerning the aesthetic appreciation of nature subsists in the
overarching dichotomy between aesthetic relativism and
aesthetic objectivism. The aesthetic relativist asserts that the
aesthetic judgments about nature are absolutely subjective
because they are entirely relative to those who make them. The
aesthetic objectivist, alternatively, claims that judgments about
nature are objectively true or false. In Carlson’s view aesthetic
Environment,” in Arguing About Art: Contemporary Philosophical
Debates, ed. Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (New York: Routledge,
2008), 161.
3
Ibid., 166.

63

Furman Humanities Review
judgments can be true if they are based on correct knowledge of
the natural environment that one experiences. In Carroll’s
model, aesthetic judgments are true if the emotional response
they convey is appropriate to the natural environment one is
responding to.4 Both Carlson’s and Carroll’s models involve
judgments that are true or false based on matters of fact
concerning the aesthetic properties of some natural phenomena.
They both presuppose aesthetic objectivism when it comes to
the appreciation of nature. Specifically, they depend upon the
existence of universal, aesthetic properties inherent in natural
phenomena, while disagreeing about the location of such
properties and how to access them.
Both Carlson and Carroll have insightful reasons for
contending that aesthetic objectivism is preferable to aesthetic
relativism regarding our judgments about the natural world. If it
were not, it would seem impossible to characterize certain
phenomena as beautiful, striking, visually appealing, and so on.
Everything in the natural world would appear to us as a
“blooming buzzing confusion,”5 as William James writes. In
order to make sense of the world we make truth claims about
the aesthetic properties of some perceptual object. In doing this,
we pragmatically dissolve any epistemic limits to our cognition
in an effort to communicate what is “appropriate, correct, or
true.”6 By comparing nature to art, Carlson thinks we achieve
the method for making qualified judgments about nature.
Because “the objectivity of aesthetic judgments of art depends
upon identifying the correct category for the artwork in
question,”7 by applying the comparable paradigm or standard to
4

Noël Carroll, “On Being Moved by Nature: Between Religion and
Natural History,” in Arguing About Art: Contemporary Philosophical
Debates, ed. Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (New York: Routledge,
2008), 177-78.
5
William James, The Principles of Psychology [1890] (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1981), 462. Quoted by Carlson, 164.
6
Carroll, “On Being Moved by Nature,” 180.
7
Ibid., 181.

64

Maia Wellborn

natural phenomena we are able to make judgments which are
either true or false about such phenomena—with the natural
sciences serving as the standard for such judgments. Likewise,
Carroll thinks that because we can objectively judge our
emotional responses to what is experiences in nature as
appropriate of not, they can give us accurate aesthetic judgments of nature.
The aesthetic objectivist views that Carlson and Carroll
champion are problematic because they assume that objectively
true judgments about phenomena in the natural environment are
what we are looking for in our appreciation of it. However, I
would argue that there are experiences in nature that are aweinspiring in such a way that they problematize these types of
objective judgments. They are grounded in an essentially
subjective appreciation that is internal to a subject’s unique
relation to it. These are experiences of the natural sublime
which in some way exceed our appreciation of nature as
something beautiful.
The natural sublime is an experience in the natural
world that overwhelms us. It might involve a feeling whereby
the object of our perception throws us back on ourselves so that
we feel our total insignificance in comparison with to nature. In
some experiences with the natural world we ride the fine line
between appreciating the imperial grandeur of a phenomenon
and the displeasing anxiety that it can arouse in our relation to
it. Sublimity in nature only makes sense when I attempt to
make sense of myself in comparison to it. I notice the difference between what is out there in the world, and what I possess
as someone who experiences the out-there-ness. Sandra
Shapshay identifies this difference when she observes that,
“what is sublime for Kant is not something in the world—some
portion of the ‘real’ that we directly experience—but a feeling
we have that is occasioned by certain sensory experiences.”8 In
8
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all of our attempts to describe the sublime we run into an
epistemic limit that allows us to communicate such experiences
only by appealing to subjective sentiments—overwhelming,
stunning, heart-palpitating. How should we approach making
judgments of an experience that necessarily involves a subject
who is at stake in the experience?
Emmanuel Levinas’s encounter with what he calls the
‘Other’ is a compelling place to start in thinking through the
answer to this question. The natural sublime may occasion a
kind of experience like the encounter with the Other, which is
initially the interruption to my “unchecked desire,” and my
“unbridled self-interest.”9 When I meet someone on the street
who asks me for spare change, for example, I am suddenly
interrupted by the Other who presents me with an ethical
responsibility. Even if I don’t think I should give them spare
change, I am still confronted with the ethical question: should I
or not? This ethical responsibility is brought about by an
asymmetrical relationship with an Other that I cannot fully
understand. For Levinas, this encounter is pre-ontological
because it inaugurates selfhood as a response to the infinite
demand upon us from each and every Other. This encounter
with the Other is not a spacio-temporal phenomenon because it
occurs in the realm of the ethical rather than in the domain of
being. For this reason Levinas answers in the negative to the
question “is ontology fundamental?” Instead, on his model, the
ethical encounter itself cannot be totalized in either concept or
being. This totality for Levinas, as Michael Morgan describes
it, is “the domain circumscribed, encompassed, and to a degree
constructed by the self of the agent, … the domain of reason or
mind or culture or theory.”10 The infinity of such an encounter
speaks to the inability of my understanding to completely grasp
the Other, and my inability ever to fully eradicate my responsibility to the Other. In this ethical encounter, I concede my
9
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ability totally to grasp the world—my very identity becomes a
response to the enigma that calls me into question and to
selfhood. My subjectivity, therefore, is a response to a question—one that is entirely foreign to me. In this sense, Levinas
asserts that subjectivity is not rooted in autonomy; it is ontologically conditioned by something exterior to it—a preceding
alterity. I gain myself because of the Other—as such, I am
never fully transparent to myself.
It follows that the experiences whereby my very
selfhood is at stake are of a different sort than the experiences
that I understand through reason alone. Being able to grasp the
beauty of a landscape in terms of an objective metric concerns
the aesthetic properties of the landscape (Carlson and Carroll).
However, an experience in nature that inaugurates my being at
stake in it is of another kind—it is the stuff of sublimity.
I imagine I am perceiving a landscape through a
detailed knowledge of the natural environment, or from behind
a camera lens at an overlook. Emotionally or cognitively, I
respond to the objects of perception as they appear—
aesthetically beautiful or complex. In doing so, I am totalizing
these objects according to my conceptual judgment of them, as
Levinas would say. I circumscribe, encompass, and construct
the view. I view it in a way in which I can rationally comprehend it. I intend an aesthetic object whereby judgments of
beauty, grandeur, etc. are of an objective quality because the
judgments are made about the object alone. What changes,
though, when I am 2000 ft. above ground on the side of a rockface, where I hang from a solitary anchor while rock-climbing?
The aesthetic appreciation we are likely to feel here (should we
dare to be there) is an altogether a different appreciation—one
that may make me aware of my finitude, shudder at the incalculable perspective, or attempt to tell myself that anxiety is
useless and I am not in danger. Any judgment I make will
necessarily be relevant to or informed by my own subjectivity—my own inability to remove the feeling from my experiencing of the sublime object. My experience with the natural
sublime is one I cannot appreciate on a basis that removes my
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subjectivity from the judgments—making them objectively the
case.
François Marty says that “totality is a matter for reason
and its satisfaction. Seeking the point at which differences rest
upon a ‘same,’ where the quest for unity is appeased, whereas
infinity is a matter for imagination.”11 Similarly, Matthew
Sanderson explains how in Kant’s view reason fits into his view
of the dynamical sublime. For Kant, the dynamical sublime
“consists in the mental relationship between sensibility and
reason that is excited by experiences of extremely powerful
natural objects...”12 In experiencing the dynamical sublime, first
we are fearful of being overwhelmed by the natural event so
that we become aware of our finitude. The event is something
that very well could crush us with absolute indifference.
However, the pleasure that we feel at the very next instant
supersedes the fear because our intellect has the ability to
reason. According to Julian Young, then, we stand in a sort of
imaginative distance with the object of sublimity in nature and,
thereby, feel this “expansion of the self, a flowing out of the
ego and into totality of things,” which Freud calls an “‘oceanic
feeling.”13
Because the sublime involves a subjective feeling
which synthesizes pleasure and displeasure towards a phenomenon, it does not warrant that a common aesthetic appreciation
for both the naturally beautiful and naturally sublime. Young
argues that “for a proper interpretation of the sublime, we need
a different metaphysics,”14 but must we embrace a blooming
buzzing confusion as a result? I think not. Jane Forsey de-
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scribes the epistemic issue with treating the sublime like an
object whose value is in its aesthetic properties when she says,
The heart of the problem, then, is this: if we focus on
the metaphysical status of the sublime object, our epistemology becomes problematic, but if we address instead the epistemological transcendence of a certain
experience, we still seem forced to make some metaphysical claim about the object of that experience.15
In order even to cognize the natural sublime we must first have
some idea about how to describe the phenomenon. Here we are
not totally without words. There is in fact a horizon of meaning
involved here just as there is in recognizing the Other in her
alterity. If there were not any horizon by which we could
account for such alterity, then the phenomena which “interrupt[s] our joyous possession of the world” would not interrupt
because it could not be apprehended at all. Crucially, Levinas
says that the Other “overflows” comprehension, not that the
other is incomprehensible. In the same way, we can say that the
natural sublime overflows our comprehension, not that it is
incomprehensible. What is required, then, is an appreciation
based on the tension between totality, because we do make
judgments about the natural sublime, and infinity, because these
judgments are always epistemically limited by subjectivity’s
inability to grasp transcendence in absolution.
What would it look like to engage with the excess of
the natural sublime without totalizing the phenomenon? In
Overcoming Onto-Theology, Merold Westphal considers a
similar question but in relation to religious existence. For
Westphal, this problem of expressing excess, while not eliminating the excess in the expression, occurs in the case of the
metaphysical God which we have fully subsumed under our
15
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own philosophical categories: “When we assume the adequacy
of our concepts to the divine reality, we make ourselves the
measure and master of that reality and convert it into the
invisible mirror of our intellectual capacities.”16 Westphal
warns, “when theology buys into this philosophical project, it
renders the God of whom it speaks religiously useless.”17 In
Martin Heidegger’s words, this is the God of philosophy and
“man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music
and dance before this god.”18 This reductionist tendency about
which Westphal and Heidegger are both worried, is strikingly
similar, I think, to an aesthetic objectivist appreciation of the
natural sublime.
Westphal suggests that Levinas answers the question as
to what God could come after postmodernism, saying, “We
must think of God as the voice that exceeds vision so as to
establish a relation irreducible to comprehension.” God
construed this way is quite appropriately another name for the
Other. Might we be more accurate in our judgments if we
apprehend the sublime object in nature similarly? Though
totalization is necessary, it is the burden of infinity imposed
through subjectivity that gives it real value. In the same fashion,
to totalize the experience of the sublime is to reduce the object
of our gaze to its aesthetic properties—to value such experiences through a reductionism—characteristic of aesthetic objectivism. What if the natural sublime were rethought, then, in such a
way as to allow for a suspension of objectivist epistemologies
in order to more appropriately gauge the object of the natural
sublime? What would this object be if not a phenomenon
available in full presence to my totalizing schemes? Appropriating Westphal, I think the answer is that the natural sublime
16
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becomes better understood as an invitation to existential
reflection.
I do not mean to suggest that the natural sublime is the
God of postmodernism, nor do I wish to equate the sublime
experience or feeling to the Other or the infinity from which the
Other calls forth. Rather, the paradigm is relevant because there
are numerous examples in relation to which Kant, Schopenhauer, Burke, and others have struggled to communicate the
essence of sublime experiences. How does one conceptualize
transcendence, as such? The natural sublime is uniquely
suitable to a phenomenologically religious discourse by means
of a Levinasian frame because it highlights the existential
traction of such an experience. It calls into question and at the
same time reaffirms the existence of the self in relation to what
is Other.
If, “the sublime is the experience of the excess of
infinity over totality,”19 then the natural sublime takes on a new
role—one that allows for an appreciation that judges such
experiences not on their aesthetic properties, but their existential relevance. The natural sublime is not valuable because it is
the activity of making life into an object of appreciation.
Rather, it is invaluable as the activity of appreciating life as a
subject living it. While the Other interrupts our “joyous
possession of the world,” the sublime interrupts our joyous
totalization of nature in the aesthetic objectivist attitude. The
natural sublime understood as such may not lead us to God or
replace our encounter with the Other, but it can provide us with
an experience that inspires the awe and celebration that has
traditionally been the province of the divine. The postmodern
approach can help us better to understand and appreciate this
existential dimension of the natural sublime—whether we are
hanging off of the cliff or taking a picture of it from a distance.
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